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Special Presentation

Approaches to Financing Care for the Uninsured
S. E . B e r k i , M A *

A

bout 1 million people in Michigan, or 10% of the state's
population, have no health care coverage, whether private
or public, A much larger percentage has inadequate insurance,
which is defined as not having coverage sometime during the
year or having insurance that does not cover ambulatory care
costs.
Of those in Michigan who have no health insurance coverage,
47% are employed either full- or part-time. Among those who
are 18 years of age or older, 67% are employed either full- or
part-time. About 28% of all the uninsured are people under age
18 years.
Health insurance coverage varies significantly by industry.
The rates for those who have no coverage are 32% in the repair
industry, 31% in personal services, 26% in agriculture, 24% in
construction, and 3% in manufacturing.
To a great extent, the issues related to the lack of health insurance are issues of poverty and of urban poverty. More than
half (53%) of the uninsured population in Michigan live below
150% of the poverty level, and 81 % live in urban areas.
Thus the great bulk of the poor, working or nonworking, uninsured population is concentrated in the major cities. While one
aspect of the urban health care problem is that a large number of
poor people have no coverage, an additional aspect is the inadequacy of Medicaid payment rates.
Consequences for the uninsured are seen primarily in terms
of access; for providers, the consequences appear as uncompensated care; for employers who do provide coverage the consequences are felt in terms of cost-shifting. About 15% of the cost
of health care coverage paid by employers who do provide insiu'ance is a hidden tax in payment for those who are not covered.

Approaches to the Problems of the Uninsured
To assess the nature and magnitude of this problem, two
years ago the Govemor of Michigan established the Task Force
on Access to Health Care. The Task Force includes representatives of all major interest groups, including big and small businesses, as well as individuals who represent the Governor. In
fact, the two co-chairpersons of the Task Force are the Secretary
of the Department of Social Services and a vice president of one
of the automakers. A number of economists and researchers
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worked with the Task Force in gathering data and in developing
options. After several false starts, the Task Force decided to consider three types of approaches to deal with the problems of lack
of coverage.
The first approach was much like Senator Edward Kennedy's
(D-Mass) plan in which all employers, except some very small
and high-risk businesses, would be required to provide a fairly
comprehensive level of health care benefits. This would be combined with a publicly subsidized plan to cover others under
200% of the poverty level.
The second approach was a less comprehensive, voluntary
approach, of which one component would encourage parents of
children living at or below 200% of the poverty level to buy into Medicaid for their children. The state would fully subsidize
families with incomes up to 100% of the poverty level, and families with incomes over 100% of the poverty tevel would pay a
graduated premium based on their income. In this kind of patchwork, voluntary approach, small businesses would be encouraged to participate in ri.sk pools which might be subsidized, although to what extent is not yet clear.
The third approach involves a universal, publicly financed insurance plan that would provide comprehensive benefits to all
Michigan residents. This state plan would be somewhat similar
to the Canadian model.
The Task Force quickly eliminated what Senator Kennedy is
now proposing. Wisely so, in my opinion. Mandating benefits
increases labor costs which results in increasing unemptoyment,
particularly at the state level and among small businesses. Depending on how this type of approach is stmctured, there would
also be a shift from full-time to part-time employment, although
that might be overcome in a variety of ways. In addition, mandating benefits does nothing to eliminate uncompensated care
or to mainstream Medicaid, and it maintains alt of the difficulties and the problems that are associated with Medicaid, tt does
nothing to improve the business climate in terms of domestic or
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foreign competition, and it does nothing for cost containment
except perpetuate the failure of certain types of approaches.
The second approach, the patchwork, voluntary approach
which includes the "kiddie plan" for the poor, insurance pools
for small businesses, and managed care plans, is not much better. It would be some improvement for extremely poor children
but would do nothing or very little for the 500,000 people who
are uninsured and unemployed. Small businesses would have to
act against their own best interest to buy into these pools, because they would voluntarily have to increase their labor costs.
Unless they have to increase these costs, we have little reason to
expect that the majority would do so, unless they faced a tight
labor market. This approach would do nothing for those who are
not in the labor force, the poor, and the near poor who are neither employed nor qualify for the current welfare programs. It
would also do little to reduce the need for cost-shifting becau.se
it would retain the current inequitable level of Medicaid payment rates. This approach does have one major advantage; it
would cost very little to the state. In fact, in Michigan this kind
of a plan could be paid for by increasing some "sin" taxes, essentially those on cigarettes and alcohol.

The need for reform in the health care system
is widely accepted. We may not agree on the
methods, but we do agree on the outcomes of
assuring access to quality services, stopping
cost escalation, preserving the best aspects of
our present system, compensating
providers
fairly, and maintaining freedom of choice and
private initiatives.

The third approach, the universal health insurance plan, is
based on four principles. First, it would provide a comprehensive benefit package to all residents in the state. Second, it would
uncouple health insurance from employment and shift financing
from the employment base to a broad tax base. Third, it would
fold existing public programs into a single statewide program
and eliminate the kind of invidious distinctions and the stigmas
currently associated with welfare health care programs, such as
Medicaid and county programs. Fourth, it would have effective
cost containment built into it.
In my opinion, the principal lesson of the Canadian experience is that universal access is affordable only if effective policies for health cost containment are in place.

Approaches to Cost Containment
The need for reform in the health care system is widely accepted. We may not agree on the methods, but we do agree on
the outcomes of assuring access to quality services for everyone
who needs it, stopping cost escalation by improving efficiency
and eliminating waste and redundancy, preserving the best aspects of our present system by relying on the private delivery of
services, compensating providers fairly, and maintaining free-
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dom of choice and private initiatives. However, without effective policies to contain costs, neither the private nor the public
sector can afford equitable access to health care for all.
Cost containment has traditionally been targeted on demand,
based on the economic theory of traditional markets, even though
none ofthis theory's assumptions fit the health care sector. Increasing the financial burden on consumers has until recently
been the major thrust of both public and private policies to contain costs. Increasing deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance
was expected to reduce cost escalation by making people more
cost-conscious and thus more careful consumers. The evidence
is overwhelming that this does not work. This year we'll be spending about 12% of our gross national product on health care, which
is strong testimony to the failure of these approaches to cost containment.
The demand approach to cost containment fails basically for
one key reason; to be effective in reducing expenditures, it is not
enough to shift cost from one pocket to the other; to reduce expenditures we must reduce either the use of services, or their
prices, or both. By reducing or even containing either utilization
or price, providers' incomes are inevitably reduced because, just
as in every other business, their incomes are determined by services sold and the prices of these services. When sellers can
largely determine which services to sell, in markets which are
rife with ignorance, fear, and dependency on the demand side,
and which are characterized by uncertainty and the lack of outcome standards on the supply side, there are ample opportunities to maintain or increase incomes by selling more and more
technically sophisticated services, particularly during a period
when medical technology, medical science, and medical knowledge are increasing rapidly. Indeed, only when the bankruptcy
of this kind of a demand approach became obvious did costcontainment advocates begin to consider constraints on supply.
After a half-hearted and eventually abandoned initiative at regional planning, the supply-side approaches to cost containment
took one of two forms; changing financial incentives or micromanaging providers.
Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS) and the largescale introduction of health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
were designed to upend thefinancialincentives dominant in the
fee-for-service market. Providers would do better not by providing more services but by providing less. In an HMO setting, reduced hospitalization rates, reduced use of sophisticated and expensive diagnostic techniques, and reduced referrals increase incomes. For hospitals with patients on the PPS, reduced services,
fewer services, and shorter lengths of hospitalizations reduce
costs and therefore increase net revenues.
In the fee-for-service system, supply-side cost containment
took the form of micromanaging individual physician decisions.
Mandatory second opinions, precertifications, recertification,
managed care, gate-keeping, and concurrent review all are intended to reduce utilization by constraining individual physician decisions with respect to individual patients. These constraints on physicians, which encourage patients to seek second
or even third opinions and which undermine the tmst in the patient/physician relationship, should make none of us surprised
by the increasing rate of malpractice litigation.
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Neither changing incentives nor micromanaging has been
successful. Expenditures for physician services have been rising
more and faster in the last three years than ever before. HMO
costs, while somewhat lower than fee-for-service costs, have
been rising at a similar, sometimes faster rate. The downtum in
admission rates and the reduction in lengths of inpatient stay
have about leveled off. while services rendered in hospitals are
increasing. Clearly, effective cost containment must take a different approach. Demand-side approaches to containing costs
have failed, and cost-shifting does not work. We need a new and
different approach.

By eliminating the burden of uncompensated
care, both the need for and the possibility of
cost-shifting by hospitals, and underpayment
by Medicaid, an all-payer system increases access to care by the poor and uninsured while simultaneously removing the threat of financial
disaster from hospitals.

A similar alt-payer system can be designed for physicians.
We have developed such a plan for Michigan. The problem is
that effective implementation of this strategy requires that there
be a single payer. Having a single payer for the entire system
could also potentially provide significant administrative costsavings, A single plan reduces administrative costs in two ways.
FirsL it reduces the administrative costs of health insurance itself. We estimate that the administrative costs in health insurance could be reduced from the current national level of 14.3%
to probably about 6% or even lower. Currentiy, 6% is about double the rate of the administrative costs of Medicare. By going to
a single-payer system, we have estimated that Michigan alone
could save about $500 million a year in direct administrative
costs. Second, the current health insurance system has a welter
of overlapping, inconsistent billing systems, reporting requirements, exceptions, eligibility certifications, etc., which impose
an indirect cost of administration on the delivery organization.
These indirect administrative costs imposed by the current system of insurance on delivery organizations amount to about
$900 million annually in Michigan.

Transforming the Health Care System
Effective cost containment must address both the stock and
supply of services as well as the flow of services. The capital
stock and the incentives inherent in the payment system influence the rate at which capacities are used. Cost-containment
policies have to be designed to limit and rationalize the rate of
growth of capital, both materially and physically, that is, in the
supply and specialty distribution of physicians. However, no
matter how effective these policies are, they are going to be effective only in the long run. In the short run, we need effective
policies that rely on uniform payment rates and expenditure targets as well as reforms of certain incentives that now encourage
excessive use, such as a reform of medical malpractice liability
litigation.
The basic aspect of uniform payment rates is the establishment of all-payer systems. Hospital all-payer systems, such as
the one in New Jersey, pay at the same rate for all patients within a given diagnosis-related group, regardless of the source of
payment. Whether Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, or Aetna is responsible for the patient's bill, the hospital
receives the same level of payment. This helps to mainstream
Medicaid because its payment rate becomes the same as everyone else's.
A most important component of all-payer systems is an uncompensated care pool; a statewide pool, possibly subsidized,
essentially financed by a surcharge on all third-party payers,
covers payment to the hospital for uncompensated care and thus
basically eliminates uncompensated care in hospitals. By eliminating the burden of uncompensated care, by eliminating both
the need for and the possibility of cost-shifting by hospitals, and
by eliminating underpayment by Medicaid, an all-payer system
increases access to care by the poor and the uninsured while simultaneously removing the threat of financial disaster from hospitals which would otherwise bear the overwhelming burden of
uncompensated care.
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Once such cost-containment mechanisms are in place, some
problems of access will have been solved by reducing the problems of uncompensated care and the Medicaid mainstream differential. Once this is achieved, we can begin the second phase
which is decoupling insurance from employment. This may be a
difficult problem, but it is not an impossible problem.
If it were possible simply to eliminate current employer contributions by converting them into wages at one time, the Federal Treasury would receive an income-tax windfall because incomes would go up an estimated $1 billion per year in Michigan
alone. Employers currentiy providing health insurance benefits
would also receive a windfall because they would have simultaneously removed not only the current costs but also the future
costs of heatth care for their employees. Employers not providing health care benefits would also receive a windfall because
they should be able to escape what is essentially their fair share
of the social costs of health care.
We have developed a transition plan to eliminate these inequities. A transition tax would be imposed on businesses, and a
graduated income tax would be introduced simultaneously.
Whether called the health security tax or the health security fee,
it is a tax, which most people, certainly the lawmakers in Lansing, would recognize However, this income tax would begin at
a fairly nominal level. Over several years it would begin to pick
up the entire cost of the health insurance plan. Obviously, other
scenarios are possible, but clearly reliance on "sin" taxes is not
enough since the entire cost of health care cannot be raised by
increasing taxes on cigarettes and alcohol. Other possible plans
would rely more heavily on sales and business taxes.
tt is important to remember that we are not talking about new
costs but about transforming the cost base from employment
and existing public programs to a broad tax base. These are not
additional costs. In fact, if the proposed cost-containment approaches were introduced, the total cost would be less under the
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public or universal plan than under the current system, which in
1987 dollars woutd save about $45 billion in ten years in Michigan alone, not counting inflation. Most would say that this is
impossible. However, if our heatth care cost pattems were to follow that of the Canadians, we would be spending 22% tess than
we do now. In 1989, this would total $130 billion nationally.
White we are similar to the Canadians in terms of living standards, cultural pattems, demographics, and health status, Canada spends about 8.6% of its gross national product on health
care whereas we spent about 12% in 1989. Yet the Canadian
system provides comprehensive benefits universally for everyone with little cost-sharing.
Publicly financed insurance that provides comprehensive
benefits for everyone is not the solution to all of our urban
problems. The crisis in the emergency room, the pregnant teenager who sees the doctor for the first time an hour before she delivers, the second heart valve replacement for the intravenous
drug addict, the patients with the acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome, most of whom are likely to be uncompensated care
cases anyway, all present major problems. The health care system must deal with some manifest consequences, but it cannot
solve by itself the underlying social problems—the drug epi-
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demic, unemployment, poverty, breakdown of the nuclear family, and violence.
These problems, or perhaps this syndrome, could be characterized as hopelessness and helplessness. A health care system
cannnot deal with that, but we can help ameliorate at least some
of its effects by assuring access to everyone on an equal basis,
regardless of a person's economic circumstance while simultaneously not bankrupting the providers or forcing them tofleethe
city because they bear too much of the financial burden. The cities themselves are badly in need of fundamental social change,
and some ofthe change must be economic.
The types of approaches which are being considered by the
Governor's Task Force on Access, as well as those being considered in Washington, DC, are band-aids. They do not address
the fundamental causes of urban health care problems crushing
the health care system and offer neither the hope nor the resources needed to provide adequate access to all who need it.
tf the economic and social health of the cities continue to deteriorate in the 1990s, further increasing the stresses on the health
care system, the day will come when we wilt look back on these
band-aid approaches and recognize them to be what they are, the
futile results of the lack of political courage.

Financing Care for the Uninsured—Berki

